It is suggested that a transition is taking place towards new modes of organising transnational corporations' innovative activities. First, different units of multinational firms, including foreign-based subsidiaries, are increasingly involved in the generation, use and transmission of knowledge. Secondly, multinationals are developing external networks of relationships with local counterparts, through which foreign affiliates gain access to external knowledge sources and application abilities. As a result of this evolutionary process, multinationals' organisation is subject to both centripetal and centrifugal forces. Considerable efforts are then necessary to innovate coordination procedures and mechanisms, in order to enhance the generation, circulation and use of knowledge. A number of empirical works are reviewed, providing some evidence of the evolutionary process discussed in the paper.
Transnational companies as networks of innovators
Economists have long viewed innovation as being primarily generated by firms in their home countries. Classic contributions in the economics of multinational corporations have consolidated this view. Referring mainly to the US-based multinationals, Vernon (1966) , Kindleberger (1969) and Stopford and Wells (1972) theorised a quasi-colonial relationship between the parent company and foreign subsidiaries, wherein the latter are in charge of replicating the former's activities abroad, with strategic decisions-including R&D and innovation strategies-being rigidly centralised. Particularly, Vernon emphasised that coordinating international innovative activities would be too costly, owing to the difficulties of collecting and controlling relevant information across national borders. Host countries and foreign subsidiaries would then play a role almost exclusively in the adoption and diffusion of centrally created technology.
This view was supported mainly by US economists and based on US evidence from the early post-World War II period, but it was very influential for the development of studies on the economics of transnational companies (TNCs) and the internationalisation of 516 A. Zanfei firms in general. Empirical research has recently contributed to undermining this view. While it remains true that the internationalisation of innovative activities has developed less than the globalisation of production and markets, several studies have provided evidence on some phenomena that had been largely disregarded by mainstream economics, such as: a relatively long tradition of internationalisation of R&D and patenting in the case of a number of European and non-US multinationals, and a significant increase in R&D and inventive activities carried out by US-based TNCs outside their home countries since the late 1960s (Granstrand et al., 1993; Cantwell, 1995; Dunning, 1994; Florida, 1997) .
foreign subsidiaries' growing recourse to multiple sources of technology, which are localised both within and beyond the boundaries of the TNC (Pearce, 1992; Cantwell, 1992; Papanastassiou and Pearce, 1995) ; foreign subsidiaries' strong involvement in cooperative agreements, especially with local firms and institutions, through which important learning processes are developed (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Forsgren and Johanson, 1992; Castellani and Zanfei, 1998). This paper attempts to develop a comprehensive interpretation of these new trends in the organisation of innovative activities. It is suggested that a transition is taking place towards a new organisational mode, based on what we may define as a 'double network'. On the one hand, TNCs are more and more characterised by the interconnection of a large number of internal units that are deeply involved in the company's use and generation of knowledge. We may name this the TNC's internal network. The traditional organisational model, based on the vertical, unidirectional transfer of knowledge from the centre towards the periphery, is being gradually replaced by a model wherein units are not only able to absorb passively knowledge generated elsewhere, but are also able to generate and circulate new information, and are increasingly tied to one another by means of cultural (values and languages) rather than hierarchical linkages. On the other hand, units belonging to the internal network tend to develop external networks, with other firms and institutions that are located outside the boundaries of the TNC, in order to increase the potential for use and generation of knowledge. These cooperative relations do not only involve the central units of the TNC, but they more and more concern the decentralised units as well, which increasingly use such networks to gain access to local sources of information and applications abilities.
The line of argument developed in this paper is as follows:
(a) This double-network organisation of innovative activities described above is favoured by the joint action of two interrelated evolutionary forces. First, developments in many scientific disciplines, along with progress in computational capabilities and instrumentation, allow a greater degree of universality of knowledge and a higher reusability of information in contexts that are different from the ones in which it was originally conceived (Arora and Gambardella, 1994) . Context-specific knowledge can be more effectively generalised and transferred through TNCs' internal networks, and made available for use in different and distant areas. Secondly, the growing availability of generic knowledge-that is partly the result of the 'generalisation' of 'context-specific' information-increases the importance of gaining access to abilities to utilise this knowledge creatively. Therefore, external networks become key assets in the competitive arena, as a means to gain privileged and timely access to user experience and skills, and to extract economic value from the growing generic knowledge basis.
(b) Foreign subsidiaries and decentralised R&D units play a key role in this process of knowledge accumulation and transfer. Setting up manufacturing and sales subsidiaries abroad is a fundamental instrument for the assimilation of indigenous culture, objectives, norms and conventions (Vaccà, 1996) . In turn, assimilating local habits and values improves TNCs' abilities to: understand and anticipate the behaviour of host countries' firms and institutions; explore user needs and technical competencies; absorb locally generated innovative ideas; and, last but not least, select partners and increase the effectiveness of external networks with indigenous counterparts. Host-country-based R&D laboratories also play a key role in this process. They should not only be considered as 'listening posts' to capture innovative ideas that are generated by the local contexts (Patel and Pavitt, 1992) . They can also play a remarkable role as interfaces between generic knowledge that is being circulated in the internal network, and context-specific information that becomes available locally by means of external networks.
(c) Local units involved in innovative activities must be endowed with a high degree of autonomy in order effectively to develop external networks of collaboration with local contexts, and to extract useful knowledge from them. Of course, an affiliate's autonomy is severely constrained by a system of international interdependence in terms of knowledge, technology, products and markets. This interdependence acts as a powerful centripetal force, strengthening connections within the TNC. However, as autonomy increases, centrifugal effects can overcome centripetal ones, and units may be induced to diminish their contribution to, and use of, the network. This might generate a dangerous shortcircuit in the knowledge accumulation process. As a result, considerable efforts are necessary to innovate coordination procedures and mechanisms, in order to prevent the internal network from collapsing. This paper has the following structure. Section 2 briefly recalls the main streams of research that are relevant to the subject discussed. Section 3 focuses on a set of evolutionary forces that spur transnational companies to reorganise their innovative activities. Section 4 examines the organisational issues raised by the changing modes of innovation within TNCs. More precisely, Section 4.1 discusses the need for autonomy and local embeddedness of decentralised units; Sections 4.2 and 4.3 analyse centripetal and centrifugal forces affecting the effectiveness and stability of TNC internal and external networks. Section 5 considers some of the existing evidence on the changing organisation of innovative activities, as it is available in the rather scattered, heterogeneous empirical literature. Section 6 analyses new coordination procedures that are required to sustain the described evolution. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Converging streams of literature
The analytical framework described in the previous section tackles at least two broader sets of issues that have been treated by different streams of empirical and theoretical literature.
First, the issue of inter-firm cooperation. In the economics and business literature, there is growing awareness that TNCs, in spite of their generally large size and resource endowments, are frequently forced to search for new sources of competitive advantages beyond their own boundaries. Cooperation is important when coping with the need to: bypass national political restrictions (Dicken, 1992) ; expand presence in culturally and institutionally distant markets (Chang, 1995; Vaccà, 1996) ; transfer and utilise relatively new, complex technologies that need extensive system integration (Mowery, 1988) ; capitalise on a combination of firm-specific, industry-specific and alliance-specific advantages (Dunning, 1993) . Other intepretive models developed in different contexts to explain collaborative ventures for the generality of firms also apply to the case of TNCs. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review this literature fully (see Ordover, 1990, and Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997 , for comprehensive reviews). For the purposes of the present analysis, it may be useful to recall the synthetic view suggested by Dunning (1995) . In his reconsideration of the theory of multinational enterprises in an age of what he and other scholars name 'Alliance Capitalism', Dunning (1995, p. 470) placed the issue of cooperation in the appropriate historical perspective: 'Of course, inter-firm cooperation is not a new phenomenon. What is perhaps new is its relative significance in an organisational form, whereby the success of the firms involved is being increasingly judged by each party's ability to generate innovation-led growth; by the range, depth and closeness of the interaction between themselves and their alliance or networking parties; and by the effect that such alliances are having upon overall industrial performance.' The growing perception of these emerging patterns of inter-firm collaboration has led a number of economists to abandon the traditional, undeviating condemnation of (horizontal) cooperation, and to consider that there are key arenas in which it can be beneficial and sometimes even make a critical contribution to social well being (Katz and Ordover, 1990; Baumol, 1992; Teece, 1992) . Among others, Baumol (1992, p. 129) has shown the limits of viewing cooperation in terms of the traditional cartel theory: 'The dividing line seems to be that between static and intertemporal efficiency. Despite its tendency to yield less than optimal allocation of resources in stationary equilibrium, collaboration may speed productivity and output growth and even reduce the costs of growth processes. ' A second and related set of issues that is relevant to this study refers to the changing internal organisation of TNCs. Two different streams of literature provide useful contributions to the analysis of the organisation of innovative activities in particular. On the one hand, a number of contributions have addressed the problem of the geographical distribution of R&D activities. By focusing on foreign R&D investments, this literature has thus contributed to the analysis of a key organisational problem, the decentralisation of innovative activities within multinational corporations. As we shall see in greater detail, the literature generally suggests that foreign direct investment is a relatively small but increasing component of overall scientific and technical activities (cf., inter alia: Ronstadt, 1977; Mansfield et al., 1979; Cantwell, 1992; Archibugi and Michie, 1995; Florida, 1997) . Among 'demand oriented' forces for decentralisation, technical support to foreign-based manufacturing plants, and government requirements and regulations are often cited. On the supply side, the diversification into new product areas and technology, and tapping into foreign scientific and technological infrastructure are usually emphasised. See Granstrand et al. (1993) and Archibugi and Michie (1995) for an extensive survey of recent research on the nature and determinants of foreign R&D investments. Some authors have also examined the coherence between the patterns of geographical dispersion of TNCs and the technological specialisation of countries and regions (Dunning and Cantwell, 1986; Zander, 1998; Cantwell and Iammarino, 1998) .
On the other hand, network-based conceptions of the multinational corporation have embraced the notion of increasing geographical dispersion of strategic assets, including R&D and knowledge-based activities in general. These contributions have emphasised the competitiveness-enhancing role of organisational structures characterised by a high commitment and autonomy of foreign subsidiaries, and by strong horizontal and lateral information flows (Hedlund, 1986; Bartlett, 1989, 1990; Nazula, 1999) . Tensions tend to arise between decentralisation and centralisation pressures (see Martinez and Jarrillo, 1989 , for a review on this issue), and alternative strategies are designed to meet an appropriate balance between these forces. Several studies have addressed the advantages and pitfalls of such coordination mechanisms based on the sharing of values and informal communication mechanisms (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1989; Evans, 1992; Marschan et al., 1996) , and on the effort of adhering to local conventions and norms of behaviour, especially in the field of human resource management (Kobrin, 1994; Caligiuri and Stroh, 1995; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994) . Nohria and Ghoshal (1994) have shown that strategies based on a high degree of shared values among the headquarters and subsidiaries, and those based on differentiation of formal structures so as to fit the local contexts, are not mutually exclusive ways of managing intra-firm relationships effectively.
This paper attempts to address both sets of issues (inter-firm cooperation and intrafirm networking), by drawing together different streams of literature. A specific field is explored, the internationalisation of innovative activities, as a key chapter in the analysis of TNCs' evolution. Bridging different streams of literature helps identify the interdependencies existing between the two sets of issues we have just outlined. Complementarity between TNCs' external and internal networks is emphasised by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) among others. However, their view is more general in scope, as they do not fully examine the interdependencies between knowledge-based (internal and external) networks. They do suggest that the existence of internal entrepreneurial networks is a fundamental condition for the exploitation of new opportunities and for the development of what they define as the 'externally-focused ability of the organisation to create new businesses' (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1995, p. 145) . However, their analysis is only incidentally focused on firms' ability to gain access to external knowledge assets.
By contrast, our assumption is that a closer focus on innovation would help us to understand better the economics of TNCs. In fact, it may be true that the internal and external organisation of innovative activities is influenced by the general strategy and structure of the firm; however, it is also true that innovation is a fundamental engine of TNC evolution. Exploring the mechanisms through which knowledge is created, accessed and utilised is then an essential key to interpreting industrial dynamics and the changing role of TNCs in the global economy. From this perspective, some previous works by the same authors, and, more recently, by Hedlund (1994) , focus more directly on the management of knowledge. Ghoshal and Bartlett (1989) examine the determinants of the generation, adoption and diffusion of innovation within TNCs. Hedlund (1994) shows that 'heterarchical' modes of TNC organisation are more consistent (than traditional, hierarchical governance modes) with the need to allow an effective interaction between tacit and codified knowledge. However, the attention of these works is centred on TNCs' internal organisation, and the implications for the organisation of external knowledge networks are not fully examined. Our criticism is that, by disregarding (or underplaying) the role of external knowledge networks, our understanding of internal knowledge networks is significantly diminished. The view developed in this paper is that internal and external knowledge networks are by and large interdependent. As the complexity of technological and market challenges increases, it is in the interest of the TNC as a whole that all units pass on knowledge from the internal network in order to increase their ability to compete in international markets. The access to this internally available knowledge will enhance the development of external networks with local counterparts. Correspondingly, external networks enable decentralised units to accumulate the context-specific information that is necessary to extract economic value from the generic knowledge the TNC is endowed with. If generalised and codified, this context-specific knowledge contributes to expanding the knowledge base that is made available to the internal network.
The forces of change: knowledge and the role of local contexts
We have briefly reviewed a number of contributions which have highlighted relatively new modes of organising innovative activities both within and outside the boundaries of TNCs. Can we actually talk about a 'historical shift' towards such new organisation modes? According to a large number of contributions, we can. For instance, one may cite Dunning (1995) for an evaluation of TNC's increasing recourse to inter-firm alliances since the late 1970s, and Duysters and Hagedoorn (1996) for a more specific and empirically grounded focus on the growing recourse to international technical alliances; Dunning (1994) and Zander (1998) for recent longitudinal studies of the process of geographical dispersion of TNCs' technological competencies; Ghoshal and Bartlett (1995) and Malnight (1996) for the analysis of the ongoing transition towards intra-firm network-like organisation; and Hedlund (1994) for a more detailed consideration of the emerging, heterarchical modes of organising internal knowledge networks.
Most of these studies also share the view that dynamic forces have emerged in the recent economic history, and are still at work today, leading to fundamental shifts in the strategies and structure of TNCs. There seems to be a wide agreement on the very general statement that changes in the 'competitive environment', with more specific, but still generic, reference to the quickening pace and widening scope of technical change and to the globalisation of markets, are the main determinants of the alleged evolution in the organisation of international activities. Stated in these terms, the argument is shared by most scholars, no matter whether they focus on intra-firm structure (internal networks) or on inter-firm alliances (external networks).
Once we proceed to greater detail, there is probably greater consensus on the impact of technical change than on the nature and consequences of globalising markets. One may refer to the effective summary of 'technological determinants' that was proposed by Dunning (1995, p. 468) . He suggests that, since the late 1970s, technical change has had a significant impact on the organisation of TNCs for at least five reasons. First, it has raised the fixed costs of a wide range of manufacturing and service activities; secondly, it has increased the interdependencies between distinctive technologies that may need to be used jointly to supply a particular product; thirdly, it has enhanced the significance of multi-purpose, flexible technologies, such as microelectronics, information processing and transmission, and biotechnology; fourthly, it has often determined a reductionoften a dramatic one-of product life cycles; and fifthly, partially as a result of the previous changes, it has forced firms to focus on the upgrading of their core competencies and on the way they are organised as a means of improving their competitive advantages.
As far as 'demand side' determinants are concerned, Dunning (1995, p. 468 ) emphasises the increasing variety of markets TNCs are forced to deal with as a factor that is further spurring firms to increase their ability to compete dynamically. However, his interpretation of the so-called 'globalisation of markets' is not shared by all scholars. Discussing this aspect is largely beyond the scope of this work. Suffice here to notice that a number of contributions have emphasised an opposite view, according to which a process of homogenisation of markets is actually taking place, as a result of imitation, cultural cross-fertilisation and contamination, favoured inter alia by progress in communication technologies. This view, put forward in different contexts by Vernon (1979) and by Levitt (1983) , has received great attention in a large part of the business literature (cf., Porter, 1986; Martinez and Jarrillo, 1989) .
Neither position appears to be supported by convincing and conclusive evidence. For the purpose of the present analysis, it is important to observe that Dunning's position is, in fact, more consistent with a view of TNCs as network-like organisations. The point is that national and regional differences in terms of culture, values and demand structures, help justify TNCs' increasing recourse to both internal and external networks. To the extent that local contexts are different, and can thus be considered as sources of differential advantages, there are high location-specific advantages from the decentralisation of R&D, there is a greater justification for a high delegation of decisions to business units active in local markets, and horizontal communication between decentralised units is more and more needed. In other words, internal networks are by and large a response to high and increasing diversity of local contexts. External networks are also positively affected by diversity. In fact, local diversity is a source of complementary assets for multinational firms, and acts as a fundamental determinant of linkages with local firms.
1
Considering local contexts more as sources of competencies and of technological opportunities, and less as constraints on the action of multinational enterprises, marks a fundamental departure from the conventional approach to international business. Hedlund (1986, pp. 20-1) probably caught the essence of this new way of theorising the role of local contexts: 'The main idea is that the foundations of competitive advantage no longer reside in any one country, but in many. New ideas and products may come up in many different countries and later be exploited on a global scale.' Later, Kogut (1989, p. 388 ) expressed a similar, complementary view: 'What is distinctive in the international context, besides larger market size, is the variance in country environments and the ability to profit through the system-wide management of this variance. ' From this perspective, Dunning's position can be fully appreciated and enriched if we take the 'value of diversity' into the appropriate account. He submits that it is the combination of the technical determinants mentioned above, with the differentiation of demand induced by globalisation, that is increasingly forcing firms to be more dynamically competitive, and has caused firms-and particularly large hierarchies-to reconsider both the scope and the organisation of their value-added activities (Dunning, 1995, pp. 468-70) . In the light of the previous discussion, we should add that demand diversity is only part of the variety TNCs have to deal with. Local contexts can be considered as differentiated and evolving sets of cultural values, institutions and norms that influence the behaviour of economic agents and their ultimate performances.
2 It is this ever increasing variety, and not only demand diversity, that-combining and interacting with technical change-pressures for TNCs to transform their organisation.
1 Cumulative effects can be expected to be present. To the extent that backward and forward linkages are created, these increase the likelihood that local development occurs (Hirschman, 1958; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996) . Local development will create further externalities for TNCs, thus opening up new opportunities for collaboration with indigenous firms (Castellani and Zanfei, 1998) .
2 This is consistent with a view of institutions as interacting with both economic and technical change (cf., Freeman and Perez, 1988; North, 1990) . There is also some correspondence here between our line of argument and the one developed by other authors who emphasise that historically determined networks of personal and social relationships among economic agents influence the organisation of their transactions. Some scholars indicate these networks of personal and social relationships with the term embeddedness. Granovetter (1985, p. 503) suggests that, where such networks are stable and do not generate occasions for malfeasance and conflict, we should expect pressures towards vertical integration to be absent. This insight was developed and applied to the study of international business especially by scholars of the 'Swedish school' Our understanding of TNC evolution could be significantly improved if we examined in greater detail the interactions between technical change, on the one hand, and the variety and evolution of local contexts, on the other. One way to proceed is to consider briefly, firstly, some of the emerging changes in the nature of scientific and technological progress that are affecting a wide number of industries; and then the impact of these changes on the role of local contexts; finally, we shall draw some implication for the organisation of international business.
Let us start with scientific and technological factors. Arora and Gambardella (1994) have emphasised that a number of scientific advances over the past 30 years, together with the remarkable evolution which has occurred in the field of instrumentation, particularly computers and communications devices, induced a significant increase in the availability and use of what they call 'general and abstract knowledge'. Following their definition, we can identify 'abstract' knowledge with the ability to represent phenomena in terms of a limited number of 'essential elements', abstracting from the specific context in which such phenomena were originally observed; and 'general' knowledge with the ability to relate the outcome of a particular experiment to the outcomes of other experiments that may be distant from a historical, geographical or even logical point of view. New (computerbased) experimentation technologies enable researchers to test theories more rapidly and effectively, and even to prove theories that could not be tested with old instruments; while scientific advances improving the theoretical understanding of problems make it possible to formalise them, so that relevant information can be processed with new instrumentation.
2
The wider and wider pool of generic knowledge that is becoming available within and across firm boundaries increasingly requires that firms gain timely access to 'contextual' knowledge, that is, information on specific applications environments and user needs. This brings us to the second step in our analysis: the changing nature of scientific and technological progress enhances the role of local contexts as a source of economic value for the innovating firms. In other words, it is context-specific knowledge that makes the difference and determines the competitive advantage of firms.
Context-specific knowledge is highly complementary to the development of general and abstract knowledge. Two reasons for this can be proposed here. First, general and abstract knowledge is 'sterile' from an economic point of view, if considered in isolation from contextual knowledge. In fact, companies with a high general and abstract know- (Forsgren and Johanson, 1992; Andersson and Forsgren, 1995) . Following the Marshallian tradition, several economists have also stressed the social and institutional determinants of collaborative behaviour which characterise the formation and evolution of industrial districts in Italy (Becattini, 1979 (Becattini, , 1990 Brusco, 1982) . Similarly, multinational growth has recently been analysed as an important case of internationalisation whose patterns are largely influenced by local institutional and social factors (Vaccà, 1996) .
1 It would be best if the unit of analysis could be precisely defined, possibly at the very micro-level of individual firms active in specific industries and within geographically circumscribed local contexts. Nevertheless, some useful insights can also be drawn if the analysis is kept to a somewhat intermediate level, between the very general one adopted by most analyses of TNC evolution, and the one that would be best suited to capture the real essence of organisational change.
2 Examples of how the availability of cheap computational power may extend the application and the development of theoretical knowledge (and vice versa) can be drawn from the fields of biotechnology, new materials, airplane production and testing (Arora and Gambardella, 1994, p. 525-7) . For instance, a recently developed theorem using the principle of energy minimisation reduced the number of alternative molecular structures of a given protein chain in such a way that information is processable by supercomputers. This made it possible to speed up the process of exploration of given molecular structures and of their interactions with other molecules.
pp. 515-542 Zanfei 937 2/8/0 10:34 am Page 522 ledge endowment, but with no contact with contextual knowledge are not able to evaluate actual user needs and expectations, and will then encounter very limited commercialisation opportunities. This will undermine the very possibility of funding R&D efforts and the generation of knowledge itself. Secondly, the generic knowledge base can be further expanded through the contact with context-specific information. Application experience may highlight puzzles and problems to be solved, thus stimulating research at all levels, and eventually generating new generic knowledge (Rosenberg, 1969) . Furthermore, localised, context-specific experience conducted at the level of both manufacturers and users can eventually be decontextualised and enrich generic knowledge as well.
1
The trends described have fundamental implications for the internationalisation of business. First, advances in information processing and communication technologies increase the incentives for firms to codify knowledge and lower the cost of exchanging information between different and distant nodes of a TNC's internal network. This is the most commonly considered aspect in the economic and business literature. Secondly, and less obviously, developments in the theoretical understanding of phenomena together with computational progress increase the rapidity and effectiveness of the process through which knowledge can be decontextualised, codified and transferred to the different sites where it has to be employed.
2 As a result of this process, local knowledge can be decontextualised to enter the cycle of generation of new economic value (Becattini and Rullani, 1993) . In the case of transnational companies, this implies that all subsidiaries can enter this cycle of knowledge use and development at a lower cost and with greater potential advantages than in the past. Thirdly, the growing possibilities offered by science and technology to generalise, codify and transfer knowledge make it more and more necessary for firms to gain access to local resources and competencies, and to absorb the stimuli deriving from local applications experiences. The point is that such an access tends to require that firms 'take root' in local contexts, i.e., they must be deeply involved into local economic, cultural and institutional life. We shall suggest that one of the most effective ways to take root in host economies, and gain access to valuable context-specific noncodified knowledge, is by setting up formal and informal cooperative networks with indigenous partners.
Organising TNCs' generation, transfer and use of innovation
We have argued that scientific and technological evolution is spurring TNCs to increase their efforts to take root in local contexts, in order to get acquainted with user needs, and to gain access to applications capabilities that are necessary to exploit and enrich the available body of knowledge. Three fundamental organisational issues are at stake here. First, what determines the degree of decentralised units' autonomy within the TNC ? Secondly, which centripetal forces are at work, favouring communication, connections and cooperation between the TNC's autonomous units? Thirdly, and conversely, which are the centrifugal forces emerging in the new scenario and acting in the opposite direction of disintegration?
The need for autonomy within the TNC
The first question is a crucial one, when dealing with the TNC's dynamic efficiency. Particularly in the case of multinational companies that are exposed to fierce competition based on innovation and on the exploitation of highly differentiated markets, foreign subsidiaries will tend to be endowed with a high degree of decision-making autonomy in their innovative activities. In fact, to the extent that local contexts are a fundamental source of opportunities and competitive assets for TNCs, centralising information and strategic decisions is more and more likely to be infeasible and ineffective.
It becomes infeasible because the increasing variety and variability of challenges stemming from the local context augments the problems related to the bounded rationality of economic agents. Also, the more subsidiaries extend their ability to use and generate relevant information through interaction with local contexts, the less are parent companies legitimated to exert an ex-ante control on decisions to be taken. From this perspective, some authors have emphasised that centralisation of decisions within multinationals may be undermined by the growing need subsidiaries have to enter partnerships with other firms and institutions that are active in their host countries. As Forsgren and Johanson (1992, p. 27 ) have put it: 'The wish for freedom in the subsidiaries cannot be explained solely by a general desire for autonomy; it probably also stems from the demand of actors in the industrial network, e.g. local authorities and trade unions.' From this perspective, the higher the TNC's involvement into external networks with local counterparts, the greater the autonomy of units belonging to the internal network.
Centralising decision-making is also less and less effective because it would have a negative impact on the number and variety of learning patterns. Florida (1997, p. 87 ) also submits that, when foreign R&D plants are subject to complex reporting and central control, there may be negative consequences on both the decentralised units' innovative performances and on their ability to recruit and attract high-quality scientific and technical human capital. Allowing greater autonomy to subsidiaries would instead create a structure of incentives that is more attractive to qualified researchers and is conducive to experimentation and innovation. In industries characterised by high technological complexity and by a wide variety of potential applications to different local contexts, transnational corporations are particularly interested in the development of a greater exploratory and learning capacity (Vaccà and Zanfei, 1989) . Inter alia, a higher autonomy among units belonging to the internal network will favour the firm's ability to explore a wider range of collaborative patterns with local partners. The causal linkage we have emphasised earlier thus applies also the other way around: external networks not only reduce the headquarters' ability to control some decisions, determining a higher degree of autonomy in the subsidiaries; the development of external networks is itself favoured by subsidiaries' autonomy, because this will enable them to explore a wider number of alternative collaborative patterns.
To summarise, the decentralised units' autonomy is by and large forced on it by the characteristics of the environment in which the TNC is active: the greater the variety of challenges and opportunities offered by local contexts, and the higher the intensity of competition based on innovation, the greater will be the need for autonomy within the TNC's organisation. Autonomy will also be higher the larger and more commitment intensive are external networks with local counterparts. As autonomy will in turn favour collaboration, the increase in autonomy can be expected to be, ceteris paribus, a cumulative process.
Centripetal forces favouring internal cohesion
Our emphasis on decentralisation of decision-making needs to complemented by close attention to the factors favouring integration between autonomous and otherwise dispersed units. This leads us to the second organisational issue we mentioned earlier in this section, namely the problems of internal cohesion of TNCs in the presence of high degrees of affiliates' autonomy. The risks attached to autonomy without integration have been effectively summarised by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1995, p. 148) : 'In the absence of . . . an integration process, decentralised entrepreneurship may lead to some temporary performance improvement as existing slack is harnessed, but long term development of new capabilities or businesses is seriously impeded.' With specific reference to TNCs, the wide literature on coordination mechanisms has been extensively reviewed by Martinez and Jarrillo (1989) . We shall return (in Section 6) to this literature and to the administrative tools that can be designed for achieving integration between different units within the evolving TNC. Before discussing the role of these tools for internal cohesion, let us consider the centripetal forces that are at work, independent of the administrative mechanisms adopted. A wide literature on TNC internal organisation has shown that affiliate autonomy is severely constrained by a system of interdependences in terms of knowledge, technology, products, markets (cf., Dunning, 1993, ch. 8 , for an extensive review of these cohesion mechanisms). It is suggested that, as a result of the evolutionary process examined in Section 3, additional incentives come into play, stimulating decentralised units to cooperate.
Increasing centripetal effects are partly the result of growing competitive pressures. Coping with globalising markets and evolving technology implies that each unit will be induced to collaborate with the headquarters and the other units to solve problems that neither the headquarters nor subsidiaries can solve individually (Evans, 1992, p. 92) . This is only part of the story. The emerging organisational mode not only allows access to useful knowledge in favourable conditions. Units belonging to the internal network are also enabled to exploit fully their own knowledge bases. In other words, a powerful incentive to cooperation within the network is the expectation of being able to take advantage of potential economies of scale in the generation of knowledge, owing to the large variety of alternative uses of knowledge itself that are accessible through the transnational network (Grandinetti and Rullani, 1995) . Thus, the costs of adapting products and processes to local markets can be kept low for two distinct reasons. On the one hand, the decentralised unit does not need to invest in the whole process of design and development of innovation in order to satisfy local demands. It can skip part of this process by attaining useful knowledge from the network, and using this for local applications. On the other hand, the generation and accumulation of the context-specific, applications-oriented knowledge that is necessary to mould technology according to local needs can be at least partially generalised, circulated and reutilised on different sites of the transnational complex. And this reduces the unit costs of the context-specific knowledge that the TNC must sustain.
It is worth noting that decentralised units active in small markets can enjoy (proportionally) larger advantages from belonging to the network than can subsidiaries with large markets. In fact, subsidiaries with small markets would never attain economies of scale in the accumulation of context-specific capabilities if they could not generalise it and transfer at least part of their knowledge through the network (whereas subsidiaries with larger markets may attain greater returns on their investments thanks to their local sales).
Moreover, the advantages of belonging to the networks largely depend on the effectiveness of 'interfaces' between the internal and the external networks in which the TNC is involved. We submit that decentralised R&D centres play such an interface role in the organisation of this process of knowledge accumulation and exploitation.
First, local R&D laboratories are powerful 'sensors' of technological opportunities. The more such laboratories are 'locally embedded', meaning that they use local personnel and develop effective networks of relations with local agents, firms and research institutions, the more this 'sensor' will be able to capture relevant information that can eventually be transformed into competitive advantages for the firm.
Secondly, host-country-based R&D laboratories play a role that is complementary to non-formalised innovative activities carried out by manufacturing and sales units abroad. It may well happen that innovative ideas come from employees working in the area of marketing or of manufacturing activities. The local presence of a research laboratory may help in exploiting this kind of technological and market opportunity more quickly and effectively than would be possible by submitting the same innovative idea to an R&D centre localised somewhere else, including the central R&D laboratories. This is not only a matter of translating the new idea rapidly into a new product or process. Communication difficulties may also emerge. In fact, one may assume that the language used by a marketing manager or a technician is better understood by the research personnel of a laboratory in the same location, and that the basic principles underlying the innovative ideas can be captured more rapidly and effectively.
Thirdly, local R&D laboratories also mediate between the pool of knowledge circulating within the TNC network, and the body of contextual knowledge that is accumulated at the affiliate level. R&D personnel generally share a common language, a system of conventions and of behavioural norms that enable them to communicate more easily across national boundaries (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) . Thus, a local R&D laboratory is better at understanding what is available, what could be useful, and what is likely to be attained from other R&D laboratories belonging to the TNC network. But this mediating role applies also in the opposite direction, from the local context to the internal TNC network. A local R&D laboratory is most likely to be efficient at generalising contextspecific knowledge, thus translating it into something that can effectively circulate and be useful to the rest of the network.
Centrifugal forces favouring disintegration
A fundamental trade-off emerges here. On the one hand, as we have just highlighted, autonomy guarantees that decentralised units are fully integrated into local contexts and are enabled to maximise learning and accumulation of application-specific knowledge. On the other hand, autonomy can constrain the circulation of knowledge within TNCs, thus dramatically reducing the advantages of specialisation and undermining the process of knowledge accumulation as well. There are two such constraints to knowledge circulation:
Constraints on the adoption of new technology. Subsidiaries with a large degree of autonomy may not be willing to utilise knowledge that is available within the TNC complex. This refusal to adopt knowledge may be due to different reasons. New technology originating elsewhere within the TNC may turn out to be incompatible with technological choices autonomously made by the decentralised unit. Incompatibilities may in turn derive from the previous adoption of different standards, or of research programmes implying a predetermined sequence of innovative steps (Arthur, 1988) . Moreover, cultural resistance can play some role, as a result of a low ability to evaluate technological alternatives, or of other non-economic factors (e.g., the nationalistic orientation of local decision-makers, lack of trust, 'Not Invented Here' syndrome). The non-adoption of knowledge can be a problem for the TNC for at least two reasons. First, it may put a brake on rationalisation effortssuch as the diffusion within the multinational network of a new, more efficient standardand worsen compatibility problems within the network. Secondly, by refusing to adopt technology available within the TNC, the reluctant subsidiary does not contribute to the exploitation of knowledge economies of scale at the network level, thus reducing the incentives of other parties to invest in the generation and codification of specialised knowledge;
Obstacles to the transfer of knowledge. The autonomy of subsidiaries may also put a brake on the willingness and capability of decentralised units to contribute their own knowledge to the network. We have already observed that some of the subsidiaries' strategic moves may be constrained by the need to abide by local rules, or decisions that are jointly taken with external parties. As was mentioned before, if subsidiaries are free to determine their own strategic alliances-and this may well be part of the innovative strategy of the TNC as a whole-some of the results of cooperation may not be available for circulation or at least be subject to contractual constraints. In addition, subsidiaries will be less available to transfer knowledge if their local markets are large, implying that their incentive to pursue knowledge economies of scales through the network will not be so compelling. Furthermore, autonomy may also generate problems with the actual access to knowledge available in the network. If subsidiaries are not willing to adopt technology from, or to contribute knowledge to, the network, other parties belonging to the TNC complex may retaliate against them by either reducing their possibility of access to available knowledge or refusing to adopt their knowledge when and if circulated in the network. Again, such conflicts are costly and may damage the good working of the network, destroy mutual trust between members of the TNC complex, and undermine the process of accumulation and use of knowledge.
The considerations above highlight that the evolution of TNCs as networks of decentralised units that are deeply rooted in different local contexts, implying a high degree of autonomy of such units, will determine both centripetal and centrifugal effects that will affect the cohesion of the TNC. New coordination mechanisms must be designed to determine an appropriate balance between the two effects. We shall discuss these issues in some detail in Section 6. Let us first provide some evidence of how relevant the phenomenon we are discussing actually is.
Emerging patterns in the organisation of international innovative activities: some empirical evidence
In this section we shall consider a rather extensive, albeit scattered, range of empirical literature to lend some support to our view of the changing organisation of innovative activities. The pieces of evidence we shall collect, and connect to one another, can hardly be thought of as a test validating our line of argument. More empirical work is needed and should be specifically focused on the hypotheses discussed in this paper. However, we shall show that several empirical contributions are, at least, consistent with our way of reasoning.
First, data are provided concerning the geographic dispersion of TNCs' innovative activities. The greater this dispersion, the stronger the shift away from the traditional, centralised mode of organising innovation. Secondly, we shall focus on evidence concerning the degree of autonomy of decentralised units. This is a key aspect of the evolution discussed in this paper: as we have argued, TNCs need to endow their own decentralised units with a high degree of decision-making autonomy, in order to enhance their ability to interact with local contexts, and to extract useful knowledge from the latter. Thirdly, we collect evidence concerning the extent to which foreign units do actually get involved in 'external networks' of relationships with local firms and institutions as a means of absorbing and utilising innovative capabilities. Fourthly, and finally, we provide some empirical basis for the idea that the changing organisation of innovative activities will call for the development of 'internal networks' through which knowledge is effectively circulated within the TNCs. This internal knowledge circulation plays a fundamental role in our framework, as a means of counterbalancing the centrifugal forces exerted by decentralisation and by the development of relationships with local firms and institutions.
The international dispersion of TNCs' innovative activities
Although R&D expenses and patenting activities abroad do not represent exhaustive measures of the internationalisation of innovation, most empirical literature concentrates its attention on these data. Indeed, there may be some doubt regarding their reliability. This is particularly the case with data on foreign R&D plants. As Warrant (1991, p. 42) has noted, quantitative measurement of R&D investments abroad is a problem because they often represent relatively new modes of internationalisation, which are not often reported in official statistics on foreign direct investments. As a result of this difficulty, most of the research has focused on selected case studies of R&D investments carried out by specific multinationals or in specific countries, providing useful albeit hard to generalise evidence. A number of studies have instead concentrated on patent data, examining the location of inventions registered by Patent Offices. Among different sources, US Patent Office data are most often utilised, as it is acknowledged that patents registered by this institution represent a significant sample of high-quality, official inventions. As Archibugi and Michie (1995, p. 131) have noted, patents are a particularly appropriate measure for testing the location of inventive activities, because they are attributed to the country of residence of the inventor rather than to that of the owner. Given these preliminary observations, different studies converge on at least three 'stylised facts':
The share of total R&D that is carried out outside the home country is much lower than the share of total manufacturing activities. With reference to the 792 largest multinationals in the world, it has been estimated that, in the mid-1980s, 30% of manufacturing was international, as compared with a mere 12% for R&D. This is true for the generality of TNCs, even though these average data hide significant international differences in the internationalisation of both production and R&D. For US TNCs, the corresponding figures were 26% and 9%, whereas for the leading European multinationals, they were 37% and 23% (Pearce, 1990; Warrant, 1991) . A recent study on R&D investments of 186 foreign affiliates of US multinationals in 1994, found evidence of a $5·14 billion total expenses, corresponding to roughly 7% of US company financed industrial R&D. This foreign R&D investment was concentrated in applied research (36%) and product development activities (58%), with a residual 8% focused in basic research (Florida, 1997, p. 88) .
European TNCs have long had (on average) relatively high rates of R&D and patenting activity abroad. The share of US patents obtained by the largest European industrial firms resulting from research located abroad (as a proportion of their own total patents in the US) was almost twice as high as the one held by the largest manufacturers in the US after the World War I (12% as opposed to 6·8% in 1920-39). The difference even increased over the subsequent decades (the shares had grown to 27·1% and 6·8% respectively in the 1969-90 period). Once again, national patterns underlying the average data are quite heterogeneous (Cantwell, 1995) . German and French-owned firms' degree of technological internationalisation was very low (lower than that of the US) at the beginning of the century, but followed a rising trend thereafter. They reached higher percentages than the US immediately after World War II and accelerated the internationalisation of their technological activities afterwards (the French and the German companies' shares of patenting abroad were as high as 9·6% and 14·2% respectively in 1969-90). British, Swiss and Dutch companies had already achieved a very high degree of technological internationalisation rather early in the century (their shares ranged from the Netherlands' 15·6% to the UK's 27·7% in 1920-39) and have continued expanding their innovative activities abroad along the same lines (the UK, the Swiss, and the Dutch companies reached 43·2%, 43·8% and 53% respectively in 1969-90). The technological activity of the Swedish firms was highly internationalised historically, as it is today, with percentages as high as 30% over the whole period.
Most multinationals, including US-based ones, have increased the internationalisation of their innovative activities over the past 30 years.
The degree of R&D internationalisation of US firms is below average, but has more than doubled between the mid-1960s and the end of the 1980s (Creamer, 1976; Pearce, 1990) . Using SPRU data, Dunning (1994, pp. 73-4) has shown that the share of US patents of the 727 world's largest firms attributable to research in foreign locations (i.e., outside the home country of the parent company) was on average higher than 10% in the second half of the 1980s. In seven out of 11 industrialised countries identified as originating foreign direct investments, and most noticeably in the US, there has been an increase in patents attributable to the foreign affiliates of multinational enterprises over the 1969-86 period. Patel (1995) examined patents granted by the US Patent Office with reference to a sample of 569 TNCs over the 1969-90 period, and shows that all firms, except for those originating in Canada, have expanded the proportion of inventive activities executed abroad. Europe increased in importance as a location for firms based in Norway, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Finland and Italy, there was little change in the activities of the Japanese firms, and UK large firms increased their activities in the USA.
The above evidence cannot be used to support the idea that technology has been fully globalised, as it is still true that most R&D and patenting activities are concentrated in the TNCs' home countries. As Patel (1995) has shown, only Belgian and Dutch firms appear to have invented new products and processes abroad more than within their home countries, and only 43 out of its 569 sample firms located more than half their technological activities outside their countries of origin. However, we are making a different point here. There appears to be strong evidence, produced inter alia by Patel himself, of a significant increase in innovative activities that are being internationalised. As Dunning (1994, p. 74 ) has pointed out: 'Broadly speaking, these movements correspond both with the extent to which there has been a decentralisation of R&D expenditure, and, perhaps more interestingly, with the degree to which the multinationalisation of firms and the cross-border rationalisation of their value added activities has increased.'
The autonomy of decentralised innovative units
The increasing geographic dispersion of TNCs' R&D and inventive activities is only part of the story. As argued earlier (Section 4.1), a key aspect of the changing organisational pattern examined in this paper is the autonomy that decentralised units actually enjoy in fields that are relevant for the management of knowledge and innovation.
There is relatively little sound evidence on this organisational feature. Important insights can be drawn from case studies and quantitative analyses conducted on small samples of firms. Ghoshal and Bartlett (1989, p. 370) cited the cases of Unilever, ITT and Philips as TNCs whose subsidiaries are endowed with considerable strategic and operational autonomy. They compared the innovative behaviour of these firms with that of multinationals with highly centralised resources and eventually observed that relatively autonomous subsidiaries created and diffused more innovations but were also comparatively more resistant in adopting innovations created elsewhere.
1 One should incidentally note that this evidence is consistent with our assumption that a trade-off exists between the innovation-enhancing effects of autonomy, and its likely negative impact on knowledge circulation within TNCs' internal networks. Warrant (1991) conducted a research based on questionnaires to managers of some 150 mainly European companies (with a 22% response rate) and provided some detailed evidence on the specific areas in which subsidiaries appear to be endowed with the greatest degrees of autonomy, and those in which autonomy is weakest. She showed that a remarkable share of firms in her sample considered autonomy to be either 'high' or 'very high' in a number of decision-taking areas. This is the case of decisions on technical alliances (75% of responding firms), but also of decisions concerning the allocation of R&D resources (66%), and research planning (55%). By contrast, autonomy is either 'weak' or 'very weak' when technology transfer decisions are at stake. These data are collected through questionnaires to headquarters managers. They may thus reflect 'wishful thinking' more than the actual trends in decision taking. However, they signal that managers are making (or willing to make) efforts to reconcile learning and flexibility advantages of autonomy with the need to guarantee a certain degree of knowledge circulation within the TNC.
The study carried out by Florida (1997) on 186 foreign affiliated laboratories of USbased manufacturing firms also provides some evidence on these aspects. His results are important because they highlight the fact that the process of decentralisation of decisionmaking has by now involved firms that traditionally had recourse to a high degree of centralisation of resources and strategic decisions. Through telephone interviews, he found that headquarters make relatively few efforts to transfer abroad the management and organisational systems associated with R&D laboratories in the home countries, and that foreign-affiliated R&D laboratories possess considerable autonomy in the development and management of their scientific and technical agendas.
Subsidiaries' embeddedness and interactions with local contexts
It has been argued that, in order to enhance their innovative capabilities, TNCs need to increase their degree of embeddedness in the local context. This is not only a matter of adapting their practices and procedures to 'fit' the local contexts and reduce the costs of conflict with local resource holders; it is also a matter of increasing interaction with local counterparts as a means of getting acquainted with values, incentive structures, norms and conventions that ultimately influence economic behaviour in a given country. Increasing and intensifying relationships with the host countries' firms and institutions will also favour TNCs' access to knowledge assets and skills available locally Empirical research confirms that TNCs, through their foreign subsidiaries, are increasingly making efforts to intensify their degree of local embeddedness, as a means of increasing their overall innovation abilities and competitiveness. TNCs' involvement in local contexts appears to have followed two different patterns. First, there is evidence that multinationals tend to adhere to local practices in the field of human resource management. Secondly, some studies have focused on the process through which TNCs' foreign subsidiaries develop collaborative alliances with local firms.
Before reviewing the results of these streams of empirical research, it is worth stressing that both patterns of local involvement we have just mentioned play a fundamental role in multinational companies' changing organisation of innovative activity. On the one hand, by adapting to local practices in the field of human resource management, TNCs are able to maintain those norms and rules of conduct that are encoded in the local workers' culture, thus safeguarding their incentive structures and creative environment. This implies that multinational firms can improve the effectiveness of their own innovative activities abroad. On the other hand, through the development of alliances with local firms, subsidiaries can gain access to external innovative abilities, and extract economic value from the application of the knowledge available within the transnational company.
Let us now briefly recall some of the empirical findings from the two lines of research we have mentioned. Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) , using evidence from questionnaires mailed to 1055 firms (with a 23·6% reply rate), have examined human resource management procedures adopted by US affiliates from non-US multinationals. Using this evidence, the authors have found that: (a) human resource management is an area in which management practices tend to resemble the ones adopted in the host countries, especially regarding time off, incentive structure (benefits, bonuses, etc.), gender composition; (b) the higher the incidence of local factors in the history of the subsidiary (pre-existence of a local firm, age of affiliate company, its size and dependence on local input suppliers), the higher the resemblance to local human resource management practices; (c) resemblance to local practices is also positively influenced by the degree of international experience of the parent company. This reflects a greater capability of the TNC to be flexible and culturally open, thanks to a longer exposition to foreign markets.
The recourse to human resource management practices reflecting local conventions
Rosenzweig and Nohria's results are consistent with the data reported in the study conducted by Warrant (1991, p. 96) . In the majority of the cases she examined, managers of decentralised R&D laboratories abroad are 'regularly' hired locally (53·3% of cases) or are at least 'occasionally' hired on that basis (33·3%). Only in 7·1% of total cases were R&D managers 'never' hired on a local basis. Research findings are less clear-cut with regard to the criteria adopted for training of R&D personnel. (It is still rare that training 'never' occurs locally, but in the majority of examined cases training is carried out on a local basis only 'occasionally'.) The research carried out by Caligiuri and Stroh (1995) also provides complementary evidence on the potential advantages associated with strategies based on the local adaptation of human resource management practices. Using data from interviews with human resource professionals in 46 TNCs, the authors found that local responsiveness in human resource management generates better performances than strategies based on centralisation and imposition of home country practices (ethnocentric strategies). Andersson and Forsgren (1995) analysed 15 Swedish multinationals and 78 of their affiliates. They found that subsidiaries tend to set up extensive networks of economic relationships (including long-term supply contracts) with local suppliers and clients. According to these authors, the frequency and intensity of transactions carried out within such 'external networks' heavily influence the affiliates' behaviour and performances, including innovation. Their study shows that the majority of relationships activated by the examined subsidiaries involves local companies, thus confirming their effort to 'take root' in the local context. Furthermore, it is rather common (25% of the sample) for the number and relevance of relationships developed with suppliers and clients which are external to the TNC to be higher than intra-firm transactions. The most frequent circumstance (45% of the sample) is one in which the number of economic relationships with partners that are external to the TNC complex is approximately as high as the number of intra-firm transactions.
The recourse to cooperative relationships with local firms
Barba Navaretti and Bigano (1998) use a sample 632 R&D agreements in 29 developing countries as a subset of the Merit-Cati database referring to the 1970-89 period. By testing a dichotomous choice model, the authors find that TNCs' R&D agreements with firms active in LDCs tend to be non-hierarchical in nature (that is, it is not possible to clearly identify a customer and a supplier in R&D contracts). Moreover, R&D agreements with local firms in LDCs are most likely to occur in knowledge-intensive industries and when technological asymmetries between home and host countries are not too large.
Castellani and Zanfei (1998) examine a wider set of 1352 agreements, including licensing contracts, joint ventures and non-equity alliances, in which 32 top European and US electronics multinationals were involved in 58 (advanced and developing) countries over the 1984-95 period. Using descriptive statistics and econometric regressions, they obtain three sets of results that are relevant for the purposes of the present analysis. First, they find that TNCs are most likely to set up linkages with local firms when they already possess a large number of subsidiaries, which act as bridgeheads for cooperation because, inter alia, they help intermediate between the home and host countries' cultures. This is all the more true when subsidiaries are well-rooted into local economies, by means of developed networks of affiliates created in the host economy over time. Secondly, linkages appear to occur more frequently when host economies are human capital intensive, as greater advantages from cooperation can be expected to arise for both the foreign and the local firms. The positive effect of human capital turns out to be even stronger in the case of alliances with firms active in the LDCs. Thirdly, the authors show that the linkage creation effects increase over time, particularly in the case of non-equity alliances, and interpret this result as revealing a cumulative process of firm 'rooting' into local contexts, and of learning by interacting.
Intra-firm communication and knowledge transfer
As suggested earlier in this paper (Sections 4.2 and 4.3), the evolution of TNCs' organisation is strongly influenced by the balance between powerful centripetal and centrifugal forces that are at work in the process of knowledge generation and use. Coordination mechanisms are designed to govern the balance between these conflicting forces (see Section 6 for a discussion of these mechanisms). As a result of centripetal tensions, reinforced by the use of coordination tools, subsidiaries can be expected to collaborate with each other and to participate in the process of transfer and adoption of knowledge within the TNC's internal network. If centrifugal forces prevail, knowledge circulation within the TNC will tend to be inefficient, and the cohesion of the internal network is at risk.
Once again, there is limited and scattered evidence on the intensity and effectiveness of knowledge circulation within TNCs. Furthermore, the perception of the actual functioning of intra-firm circulation of knowledge tends to be biased by the fact that empirical investigations are most often carried out with reference to successful TNCs.
Some insights on technology sourcing and knowledge exchanges within TNCs are contained in Papanastassiou and Pearce (1995) . These authors have based their analysis on questionnaires mailed to 560 among the world's largest firms classified by Fortune (with a reply ratio ranging between 15% and 25%), and have identified some typologies of subsidiaries and of intra-firm relationships that are worth considering here. Two 'models' of behaviour are particularly interesting from our viewpoint. The first is the most traditional one. It is represented by subsidiaries with limited or no local R&D, that are specialised in manufacturing activities for the local market, using consolidated technology. Contrary to Vernon's hypothesis, however, this subsidiary does not appear to make use only, or primarily of technology coming from the home-country. Strong recourse is made to the R&D laboratories of the TNC that are located in different countries, in order to search for the technological inputs that are most appropriate to the characteristics of local demand. Furthermore, an important role is also played by development and adaptation activities that are carried out by the subsidiary's technical personnel and by manual workers, not belonging to any R&D laboratory. The authors identify this as a signal of what they call 'creative transition' of this model of subsidiary behaviour. In their view, 'importsubstituting activities have evolved into sophisticated localised activities where products are differentiated (if they are already established) or even new products are introduced, to meet the specific demand needs of the host-country market' (Papanastassiou and Pearce, 1995 pp. 2-3) . In order to carry out this more creative role effectively, technology is not only transferred from the home-country, but 'is also a network phenomenon', so that different sources can be utilised according to local needs and priorities.
The second model identified by the authors is the most common in their analysis. It is a subsidiary that manufactures goods with consolidated technology, but sells them also outside the market in which it is based. This firm not only uses technology transferred from both the home-country laboratories and from other countries' R&D facilities, but local R&D, and incremental improvements carried out at the factory level continue to play an important role. As Papanastassiou and Pearce (1995, p. 5) point out: 'The continuously strong role of established technology should by no means be understood as synonymous for a hegemonic position for centrally-created technology. On the contrary, the existence of other sources of technology should indicate that such existing established technology is now increasingly likely to be the product of a group effort and not of a central operation which generously distributed the outcome of its intellectual effort to other parts of the group. ' The empirical evidence collected by the two authors confirms that TNCs' innovative activities are more and more the result of an intensive exchange of technology between different units connected through an internal network of knowledge circulation. It also highlights the key role played by local knowledge inputs, generated both by R&D laboratories that are active close to the market, and by improvement activities that are not institutionalised in any research plant. These incremental activities take place within the factory, but also require an effort to acquire relevant information on the nature and characteristics of local demand. Important learning processes also occur thanks to the abilities and sensitiveness of manufacturing and marketing employees, who are most likely to have a continuous perception of the challenges and opportunities that characterise everyday life in the specific context where the firm is active.
However, Papanastassiou and Pearce's research does not provide information on the nature and intensity of the communication flows and communication needs between the different units belonging to the TNC. The study conducted by Warrant (1991, pp. 95-6) shows that the most relevant information exchanges that are actually occurring (in terms of frequency of messages being exchanged) are the ones between decentralised R&D units and central R&D laboratories, whereas contacts are much less frequent between R&D laboratories, on the one hand, and marketing and manufacturing departments on the other hand. At the same time, the managers interviewed have highlighted that communication needs are highest across functional levels. Particularly, marketing managers and production managers need to communicate with R&D managers, even if they do not actually happen to do so.
A survey conducted by Pearce (1990) , based on a sample of 82 firms, examines more closely the 'quality' of knowledge flows within TNCs. His findings show that, in only 25% of considered cases, 'promising' knowledge developed by subsidiaries or decentralised R&D laboratories were actually transferred to the central laboratories. A 'slightly higher' tendency to transfer technology the other way, from central laboratories to decentralised centres, is also recorded.
The research carried out by Fors (1997) also sheds some light on the asymmetries of information flows occurring between the centre and the periphery of TNCs, and reaches even stronger conclusions. He uses the data from a survey covering a sample of 121 Swedish multinational manufacturing firms during the 1965-90 period. His findings indicate that firms' R&D undertaken in the home country is actually transferred and used as an input in both the home and foreign plants of the TNC. Around four-fifths of the gain in value added attributed to the home R&D was realised in the TNCs' home plants. R&D in foreign affiliates does not appear to be used in home plants. When the analysis is undertaken separately for the two time periods 1965-74 and 1974-90 , the share of the gains realised in the foreign plants appears to be increasing, although this trend is not statistically significant.
The studies we have just briefly reviewed are revealing of the complexity of communication problems in TNCs, especially when new knowledge transfers are at stake.
Their results are consistent with the widely shared perception that technology transfer and utilisation within TNCs is subject to difficulties and constraints. Even though the reviewed analyses do not allow reliable conclusions on the evolution of intra-TNC knowledge exchanges over time, they do not contradict the idea, put forward in this paper, that obstacles to knowledge circulation and centrifugal effects are likely to increase as TNCs evolve towards organisational patterns characterised by a high level of decentralisation of decisions and by a greater involvement of foreign affiliates in networks of relationships with local counterparts. This calls for a closer consideration of coordination issues.
Changing coordination modes
A widely held view is that TNCs need to adopt effective organisational devices that, while safeguarding the autonomy of units, ensure an acceptable degree of cohesion. As put forward earlier in this paper (Section 4), if no effort is made to innovate coordination modes, this could undermine the process of generation and utilisation of knowledge underlying TNCs' evolution and success.
The existing literature on international business offers limited insights into how to solve the problem of coordination in the presence of a high degree of autonomy of decentralised units.
1 Martinez and Jarrillo (1989) have conducted a broad review of the economics and managerial literature, and found a significant convergence on the idea that decentralisation processes within transnational companies tend to be associated with the adoption of 'subtle' and informal coordination mechanisms, based on the transfer and rotation of personnel, and on the sharing of values and general 'strategic visions' (Martinez and Jarrillo, 1991) . Such mechanisms usually coexist with, and sometimes substitute for, the definition of 'organisational architectures' entailing rigidly designed roles and tasks for subsidiaries and even individuals within the multinational. According to some authors, the recourse to softer integration mechanisms helps solve the internal cohesion problems that frequently accompany processes of decentralisation of responsibilities within formerly centralised organisations (Egelhoff, 1984) . As mentioned already, Nohria and Ghoshal (1994) , with reference to a database recording detailed information on the structure and strategies of 66 TNCs active in 19 countries, found evidence of an effective mix of efforts to adapt to local contexts with strategies based on sharing values and objectives across the organisation.
However, it may be simplistic and even misleading to identify changes in coordination modes with the mere substitution of the traditional 'bureaucratic control' by more sophisticated, and subtler forms of 'cultural control'.
2 This is for two fundamental reasons. On the one hand, this view underrates the potential conflicts that such a cultural integration imply, especially in the presence of marked differences in local contexts where the firm is active. As a result, strong cultural cohesion may generate a loss of flexibility (Evans, 1992) , while the substitution of informal communication flows to more structured, formal communication may turn out to be counter-productive (Marschan et al., 1996) .
On the other hand, the problem of 'who' generates the 'glue' to allow internal cohesion should also be faced.
Once these issues are taken into account, the coordination problem turns out to be much more complex. As a result of this complexity, after more than two decades of academic debate and actual experimentation, there appears to be no agreement on the nature of the 'ideal coordination structure'. However, it appears to us that future research and managerial experience in this area could fruitfully be based on at least three key concepts.
First, internal cohesion can usefully be seen as 'socially constructed'. Especially in the presence of a high institutional and economic diversity of local contexts, effective cohesion is more likely to be the result of a complex, iterative and time-consuming, and continuing interaction between the parties involved in the multinational corporation, than the outcome of a mere imposition of values, cultural beliefs and aims. Mere imposition of coordination mechanisms might simply undermine the potential advantages that tend to be associated with decentralisation of decision-making, if any. In fact, combining greater autonomy with no sharing of goals and values within the organisation can generate not only costly conflicts, but also a much higher uncertainty about the behaviour of individuals. Some units within the organisation will generally take the lead in such key activities as designing general goals and priority areas of investment (and we shall see that these key roles are not necessarily controlled by the headquarters). However, successful implementation of these decisions will entail ensuring that such goals and priorities are perceived as advantageous by most if not all other units.
Secondly, the role of TNCs' headquarters is also subject to fundamental changes. As Dunning (1993, p. 221) has observed: 'The head office becomes less a centre of control and more a means by which the constituent parts of the organisation make their own inputs into decision making process.' In a similar vein, Evans (1992, p. 90) suggests that: 'This new role is not to solve people's problems for them, but to lead a process whereby people get together to solve their problems or to explore opportunities that require joint collaboration.' This is particularly apparent when 'global mandates' are assigned to subsidiaries or groups of subsidiaries. Roth and Morrison (1992, p. 718 ) develop this point: 'The parent corporation's task shifts to managing dispersed strategic processes, ensuring that subsidiary strategies continue to fit the overall corporate goals, and providing the resources and freedom required to support the mandates.' As we shall see below, one may question whether all of these functions should be attributed to the parent company on a permanent basis. The point to be stressed here is that the basic headquarters' function is one of creating the conditions for the effective working of increasingly autonomous units.
Providing an exhaustive list of actions that are required to create such conditions is beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it here to stress the importance of 'setting the rules of the game' within the multinational organisation, including the definition of career tracks, to allow and promote the mobility of managers. The business literature has emphasised the potentially positive impact of the geographical and inter-unit mobility of managers and personnel in general, as a vehicle of information transmission and cultural cohesion (Hedlund, 1986; Evans, 1992) . Vertical mobility may also turn out to be an essential part of the incentive structure and a fundamental tool for reducing coordination costs. In particular, local managers with a credible prospect of climbing higher levels in the transnational hierarchy will be more likely to circulate information and to use local resources to attain goals that are shared by the whole corporation. Among other effects, incentive structures based on vertical mobility thus have an important, positive impact on the creation of what we define as 'decontextualisation' abilities at the subsidiary level. Headquarters could also play a key role in this area by promoting the development of service units to support subsidiaries in their decontextualisation activities.
A further key area of intervention for the transnational company's top management is financing. However, it is important to stress that, with increasing decentralisation of information processing and decision taking, distribution of financial resources will largely occur on a 'blind' basis. In fact, corporate headquarters will necessarily have very limited ex-ante information on what the actual destination of funds will be. According to the traditional principal-agent approach, this would necessarily imply problems in terms of opportunistic behaviour of subsidiaries. However, once knowledge generation is at stake, it is in the company's interest that subsidiaries take autonomous decisions on how to use resources. Of course, it is also in the interest of the TNC as a whole that corporate headquarters check that the subsidiaries' behaviour is consistent with a given set of values and goals, in order to favour, inter alia, intra-firm circulation of newly generated knowledge. But this convergence can only be evaluated ex-post. This implies that the headquarters' financial function should gradually evolve from allocating money according to a predefined plan, towards a sort of reward system, wherein fund distribution corresponds to the top management's evaluation of previous performance.
Thirdly and finally, is it necessary that all coordination functions, however modified, be carried out by the parent company? If we take our reasoning to its extreme conclusion, the answer to this question can only be negative. In principle, leading roles within the company may change in time as a result of modifications in the relative distribution of competences that are relevant whenever a new competitive challenge emerges; or as a result of a distinctive performance by a given unit within the organisation. In other words, from time to time, different actors or units within the organisation may be recognised as 'leaders' by the other units or actors, because it is acknowledged that they may perform better in that role in the interest of the organisation as a whole 1 The locus of coordination can move over time both vertically and horizontally. With reference to vertical coordination, even if the headquarters usually keep formal control on final decisions, these decisions may be heavily influenced, and even forced, by pressures exerted by different subsidiaries over time, according to their bargaining power which, in turn, reflects their recognised competence and ability to obtain positive performances. This implies that, for instance, changes in investment priorities and in broad strategic visions may reflect modifications in the relative positions of different units within the organisation.
As far as horizontal coordination is concerned, one may expect that important resource flows take place between subsidiaries, without necessarily undergoing control from the top management. For instance, different subsidiaries based in culturally homogeneous regions may find it useful to exploit their complementarities and exchange information and assets accordingly. There is no real need for this form of horizontal coordination to receive prior approval from top management. Moreover, the headquarters need not promote these information exchanges, as cultural homogeneity would reduce decontextualisation and communication costs anyway. Leadership in the government of horizontal resource flows of this kind can again shift over time as a result of changes in the quality and level of competence of subsidiaries, or as a consequence of their distinctive performances.
Although there certainly are good reasons why a large fraction of coordination functions should move over time and be controlled in a less and less stable way, some of these functions will tend to 'crystallise' more than others. This may occur both for efficiency reasons-maintaining a stable 'leader' in a specific position may be more effective than changing it too frequently-and because of the 'natural' rigidity and resistance to change of organisations-some roles and power positions may stabilise because inertial forces are at work and constrain forces for change. One typical functional area where stability is the result of both efficiency criteria, and of path dependence, is finance. On the one hand, fund-raising may be less hard a business to accomplish if money suppliers clearly identify one and only one counterpart on a stable basis. On the other hand, fund-raising, and fund distribution in particular, certainly imply the accumulation of power and of the ability to condition and constrain fund users. As a result, this area will presumably remain at the parent company level with limited exceptions.
Furthermore, financing can also be a fundamental instrument for the ex-post sanction of the performances of those units that are endowed with a high degree of decision-making autonomy. This role could most effectively be covered by a sort of super partes unit that is relatively stable in time. A 'natural' candidate to play this role is the parent company, because it has generally carried out monitoring functions for longer time and has accumulated relevant information and skills that may be usefully employed for this task.
In sum, one may argue that, as a result of the joint action of the forces we have examined, the parent company is less and less able to exert an effective ex ante control over the other units of the transnational organisation; but, for historical reasons, it remains a unit endowed with more capabilities than other centres within the multinational for effectively carrying out an ex post evaluation of how coherently the other units behave with regard to given objectives.
Concluding remarks
It has been argued that powerful forces are spurring TNCs to modify the way they organise innovative activities. Firms appear to resort increasingly to what we have identified as a 'double network' (internal and external to the TNC) through which all the units belonging to the company are enabled to gain access to, and contribute to, knowledge available for economic uses. TNC units have strong incentives to tap knowledge from the internal network, but also to contribute to it. As technical and market complexities increase, they have less and less possibility of 'going to it alone', without taking advantage of the wider set of knowledge assets available within the TNC network. Besides, TNC units also find it advantageous to contribute to the network, as this will allow higher returns from their own investments in the accumulation of knowledge, and will increase their bargaining power within the network itself.
However, it would be mistaken to conclude that this is a 'natural', market-driven evolution of the firm. This new mode of TNC organisation implies considerable, conscious efforts to enhance the decentralised units' abilities to innovate. This requires high investment in resources, competences and cultural background. Furthermore, as we have argued, the development of the TNC internal network relies heavily on, and favours, the growth of external, locally embedded networks, which in turn require increasing degrees of autonomy for decentralised units. This increasing autonomy continuously risks
